South Sudan’s Endless Dawn

The South Sudanese Civil War is an armed conflict that erupted in December 2013 between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), pitting government forces under President Salva Kiir—predominantly from the Dinka ethnic group—against opposition forces led by former Vice President Riek Machar, mainly from the Nuer ethnic group, amid a power struggle that rapidly devolved into ethnic massacres and militia warfare. Triggered by Kiir's dismissal of Machar and accusations of a coup attempt, the fighting quickly spread from Juba nationwide, exploiting pre-existing clan rivalries and competition over oil revenues in a state lacking robust institutions just two years after independence from Sudan. The war has caused an estimated 400,000 deaths, including from direct violence, famine, and disease, while displacing over 4 million people internally or as refugees, devastating the economy and infrastructure. Both sides have perpetrated atrocities, including targeted killings, rape as a weapon, child soldier recruitment, and scorched-earth tactics, with no faction holding a monopoly on culpability. A Revitalized Agreement in 2018 established a unity government and power-sharing, but implementation stalled due to distrust, constitutional delays, and sporadic clashes, culminating in Machar's house arrest and treason charges by 2025. As of 2025, escalating inter-communal violence and opposition-government skirmishes have displaced hundreds of thousands more, postponed elections to 2026, and heightened risks of collapse into full-scale war again, underscoring the fragility of elite bargains in a resource-cursed, ethnically fragmented polity. International efforts by IGAD, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and regional actors like Uganda have mediated ceasefires but failed to address underlying governance failures or militia proliferation.

Historical and Political Background

Pre-independence conflicts and roots in Sudanese civil wars

The First Sudanese Civil War commenced on August 18, 1955, when southern Sudanese soldiers mutinied in Torit, killing approximately 336 northern soldiers and civilians amid fears of domination by the Arab-Muslim north following Sudan's impending independence from Britain. Southern grievances stemmed from ethnic disparities between the African-majority south and Arab north, religious tensions between Christian and animist southerners versus northern Islamists, and economic neglect that left the south underdeveloped despite its resources. The conflict displaced over 500,000 people and killed tens of thousands before concluding with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted the south regional autonomy, a southern assembly, and control over local administration, though implementation faltered due to Khartoum's centralizing policies.

Unresolved issues from the first war, including northern encroachments on southern oil fields discovered in the late 1970s and the 1983 imposition of Islamic Sharia law nationwide by President Jaafar Nimeiri, ignited the Second Sudanese Civil War on May 16, 1983. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), founded by John Garang—a Dinka colonel trained in U.S. military academies—initially sought a secular, united "New Sudan" rather than outright secession, mobilizing southern fighters against Khartoum's Islamization and resource extraction policies that funneled oil revenues north while displacing southern communities. The war ravaged southern Sudan, causing an estimated 2 million deaths, widespread famine, and over 4 million displacements, exacerbated by internal SPLM/A fractures such as the 1991 Nasir split led by Riek Machar (a Nuer), which pitted Dinka-dominated factions against Nuer and Equatorian groups in ethnic-tinged violence that foreshadowed post-independence divisions.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed January 9, 2005, between the SPLM/A and Khartoum's government, formally ended the second war by establishing a power-sharing interim government, revenue splits from southern oil (with 50% of net proceeds allocated south), and a 2011 referendum on southern self-determination. Garang's death in a July 2005 helicopter crash shortly after becoming vice president intensified succession struggles within the SPLM, while the CPA's provisions for demobilizing militias—many southern groups had defected to Khartoum for arms and funds—left armed proxies and unresolved border disputes over oil-rich areas like Abyei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. These pre-independence legacies of ethnic mobilization, resource competition, and fragmented command structures among southern militias created structural vulnerabilities, as the north-south binary masked intra-southern tribal animosities (e.g., Dinka-Nuer rivalries) and elite pacts that prioritized anti-Khartoum unity over internal reconciliation.

Post-independence power dynamics and ethnic frictions (2011–2013)

Following independence on July 9, 2011, President Salva Kiir centralized authority within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which dominated the nascent state apparatus and blurred lines between party and government functions. In January 2013, Kiir retired 35 senior officers and 118 brigadier generals from the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), a move interpreted as an effort to purge potential rivals and install loyalists, thereby strengthening his command over the military. Tensions within the SPLM intensified over issues such as the national census, constitution drafting, and election scheduling, with factional debates often centering on loyalty to Kiir.

These internal purges culminated in July 2013, when Kiir dismissed Vice President Riek Machar on July 23, accusing him of undermining leadership, followed by the dissolution of the entire cabinet on July 24 and the suspension of SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum. The dismissals reflected a broader power struggle within the SPLM, where Machar had positioned himself as a challenger to Kiir's authority, exacerbating divisions that had lingered since the 1991 SPLM split. Concurrently, South Sudan's economy suffered severely from a dispute with Sudan, leading to a complete oil production shutdown on January 23, 2012, which eliminated approximately 98 percent of government revenue as oil accounted for nearly all exports. Production resumed only in April 2013 after bilateral agreements on transit fees and revenue sharing, but the 15-month halt caused budget shortfalls, delayed civil servant salaries, and heightened public discontent without prompting diversification beyond petroleum dependency.

Ethnic frictions, particularly between the Dinka (Kiir's group) and Nuer (Machar's group), simmered amid perceptions of Dinka dominance in government appointments and military promotions, alienating non-Dinka communities and reinforcing historical grievances from events like the 1991 Bor Massacre. Kiir's military reforms and cabinet reshuffles were viewed by some Nuer and Equatorian leaders as favoring Dinka elites, contributing to a sense of marginalization that manifested in localized communal clashes over resources. Informal youth militias, such as Dinka gelweng and Nuer White Army groups, engaged in cattle raids and pasture disputes during this period, signaling underlying tribal rivalries that political elites exploited for leverage. These dynamics highlighted institutional frailties, including an SPLA plagued by ethnic imbalances and loyalty fissures despite prior integration efforts, setting conditions for broader instability without resolving core governance deficits.

Root Causes and Structural Failures

Deep-seated ethnic and tribal divisions

South Sudan's ethnic landscape is dominated by the Dinka, comprising approximately 35.8% of the population, and the Nuer, at around 15.6%, alongside smaller groups such as the Shilluk, Azande, and Murle. These pastoralist communities have long competed for grazing lands and water resources essential for their cattle-based economies, fostering recurrent inter-group clashes that predate modern state formation. Historical animosities between Dinka and Nuer trace back to cycles of cattle raiding, where raids served not only economic purposes but also as mechanisms for asserting dominance and settling scores, often escalating into broader violence involving revenge attacks.

Pre-2013 escalations in cattle raiding intensified due to the proliferation of small arms from regional conflicts and weak state enforcement, transforming traditional practices into lethal confrontations. For instance, Dinka raids into Nuer territories and vice versa, alongside involvement of smaller tribes like the Murle, created interlocking revenge cycles; a 2011-2012 outbreak between Lou Nuer and Murle alone resulted in thousands of deaths and abductions, highlighting how such patterns primed larger ethnic mobilizations. Smaller tribes often found themselves caught in these dynamics, allying opportunistically or defending against dominant groups, which amplified fragmentation rather than unified resistance against external threats.

Anthropological analyses reveal cultural divergences in governance norms that exacerbated tensions in a nascent multi-ethnic state, where segmentary lineage systems among Dinka and Nuer prioritized kin-based authority over centralized institutions, clashing with federal structures imposed post-independence. These studies document how differing conceptions of leadership—tied to cattle wealth and ritual authority rather than bureaucratic merit—hindered inclusive decision-making, fostering perceptions of exclusion among non-dominant groups. Elites within the liberation movements exploited these divisions by framing political grievances in ethnic terms, mobilizing militias along tribal lines to consolidate power, though the underlying animosities were rooted in grassroots resource pressures rather than elite invention alone.

Scholars counter that ethnicity often served as a proxy for competition over scarce resources like arable land and oil-adjacent pastures, with ethnic mobilization masking economic incentives in a context of elite capture and institutional voids. Empirical patterns show that violence correlated more closely with livelihood disruptions—such as drought-induced pasture scarcity—than with primordial hatreds, suggesting tribalism amplified but did not originate causal drivers. This perspective underscores how post-independence failures in equitable resource allocation transformed latent ethnic frictions into amplifiers of conflict, rather than standalone hatreds.

Economic mismanagement, oil dependency, and elite corruption

South Sudan's economy has been overwhelmingly dependent on oil revenues since independence in 2011, with petroleum accounting for approximately 90 percent of government revenue and nearly all exports. This resource curse dynamic left the state without a diversified fiscal base, as non-oil sectors such as agriculture and services remained underdeveloped, contributing less than 10 percent to total income. The absence of a broad taxation system—rooted in historical rebel governance practices that prioritized coercive extraction over institutional revenue collection—deprived the government of incentives to build accountable institutions, instead fostering reliance on unearned rents distributed through patronage to maintain elite coalitions.

Civil war disruptions exacerbated oil sector vulnerabilities, with production plummeting from around 350,000 barrels per day in the early post-independence years to under 150,000 barrels per day by the late 2010s due to field shutdowns in conflict zones, pipeline blockades to Sudan, and deterred foreign investment. Opaque production-sharing contracts, often awarded without competitive bidding to politically connected firms, enabled elites to capture rents through inflated costs and side deals, as documented in investigations revealing billions diverted via off-budget mechanisms like the "Oil for Roads" program. These arrangements prioritized short-term elite gains over infrastructure or exploration, perpetuating a cycle where oil income funded factional loyalties rather than economic diversification.

Systemic corruption compounded mismanagement, with South Sudan ranking as the world's most corrupt nation in Transparency International's 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, scoring 8 out of 100 and placing last among 180 countries. Scandals such as ghost soldier payrolls—where non-existent troops drew salaries, siphoning an estimated 20-30 percent of security budgets—illustrated elite predation, as senior officers and officials inflated rosters with deceased or fictitious names to divert funds for personal networks. A 2017 analysis of military procurement fraud highlighted how such practices eroded operational capacity while channeling oil proceeds into private accounts, undermining any potential for state-building. UN inquiries have further exposed how $2.2 billion in oil revenues were funneled into patronage schemes between 2011 and 2023, converting public resources into tools for political control absent fiscal accountability from taxation.

Political rivalries among liberation movement leaders

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), founded in 1983 under John Garang's autocratic leadership, experienced early fractures driven by elite ambitions rather than unified ideology. In August 1991, Riek Machar, then a senior SPLA commander, led a breakaway faction known as SPLA-Nasir, accusing Garang of dictatorial rule and advocating for southern self-determination over Garang's vision of a united, secular Sudan; this split triggered violent intra-SPLM clashes that weakened the movement for years, with Machar's forces briefly controlling key areas before fragmentation. Machar's maneuver reflected personal aspirations for leadership, as he and ally Gordon Kong Chuol positioned the Nasir Declaration to challenge Garang's dominance, though it ultimately failed to consolidate power and led to Machar's marginalization until his partial reintegration in the late 1990s.

Garang's sudden death in a helicopter crash on July 30, 2005, created an immediate succession vacuum in the SPLM, exacerbating latent rivalries among its commanders. Garang had appointed Salva Kiir as his deputy just weeks prior, and Kiir was swiftly elected SPLM chairman on August 1, 2005, amid internal debates that highlighted competing claims to authority; this rapid transition averted immediate collapse but left unresolved tensions over Garang's centralized control and the movement's post-peace direction. Kiir's ascension, supported by military loyalists, contrasted with expectations of broader consultation, setting the stage for power consolidation that sidelined figures like Machar, who had rejoined the SPLM mainstream by 2002 but harbored ambitions for higher roles.

Post-2005, Kiir's appointment of Machar as vice president in 2005 aimed to maintain SPLM cohesion during the interim period leading to independence, yet underlying personal animosities persisted, with Machar viewing himself as Garang's ideological heir despite his earlier defection. By 2013, these rivalries culminated in Kiir's dismissal of Machar as vice president on July 23, following disputes over party reforms and cabinet positions; the government framed Machar's subsequent actions as a coup attempt on December 15, 2013, citing evidence of armed mobilization by his loyalists in Juba, while Machar's camp alleged exclusion from democratic processes within the SPLM and manipulation of internal elections to favor Kiir's allies. This elite contest, rooted in Garang's unresolved succession dynamics, prioritized control over institutional unity, as seen in successive purges of perceived rivals like Pagan Amum and Rebecca Nyandeng Garang from SPLM leadership roles between 2011 and 2013, underscoring how individual ambitions repeatedly undermined collective governance.

Outbreak and Chronological Phases

Spark and early escalation (December 2013–2014)

On the evening of December 15, 2013, gunfire erupted around 10:30 p.m. at the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) General Headquarters in Juba, initially between predominantly Nuer soldiers perceived as loyal to former Vice President Riek Machar and Dinka-dominated government units, stemming from disputes over an SPLM political meeting earlier that day. The clashes spread to the New Site arms depot by midnight and intensified into December 16, with government forces regaining control of key sites by early afternoon, prompting Machar to flee Juba that night and later declare himself leader of the SPLA/M in Opposition from Bentiu. This incident fractured the SPLA along ethnic lines, with defections among Nuer officers accelerating as reports of mutual suspicions fueled rapid mobilization.

In the ensuing hours and days, government security forces, primarily Dinka elements including the presidential guard and militia allies, conducted house-to-house searches and checkpoints in Juba, targeting Nuer civilians; on December 16, soldiers massacred 200-400 Nuer men at Gudele One neighborhood near a police station, shooting them through fences and later removing bodies with bulldozers, while over 60 additional extrajudicial killings of Nuer males occurred in areas like Mia Saba and New Site. These acts, described by witnesses as systematic ethnic targeting, displaced thousands and prompted retaliatory mobilizations; by December 18, Nuer-led SPLA defectors under Maj. Gen. Peter Gadet seized Bor in Jonglei State, holding it until January 18, 2014, during which opposition forces killed hundreds of Dinka civilians in revenge attacks, with at least 525 bodies later buried in mass graves.

The fighting escalated further as opposition gains in Unity State saw Maj. Gen. James Koang defect on December 21, 2013, enabling capture of Bentiu by early January 2014, where opposition fighters targeted Dinka and other non-Nuer civilians in killings, rapes, and looting that Human Rights Watch documented as potential war crimes. Government counteroffensives recaptured Bentiu on January 10 and Bor on January 18, but both sides committed atrocities amid shifting control, including indiscriminate shelling and ethnic purges that displaced over 400,000 by February 2014 and killed thousands overall in the initial phase. The United Nations reported widespread abuses by government and opposition forces alike, including killings of civilians on ethnic grounds in Juba, Bor, and Bentiu, amounting to possible crimes against humanity.

International efforts to halt the escalation began promptly, with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) brokering a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on January 23, 2014, in Addis Ababa, committing both parties to an immediate halt in fighting and humanitarian access. However, violations occurred within days, including government advances in Jonglei and opposition attacks in Upper Nile, undermining the truce as IGAD's monitoring mechanism documented over 100 breaches by February, with neither side fully withdrawing forces or ceasing mobilizations. The UN Security Council condemned the failures and expanded the UNMISS mandate in March 2014 to protect civilians, but early diplomatic initiatives yielded no sustained de-escalation amid ongoing ethnic violence.

Stalemate, failed ceasefires, and factionalization (2015–2017)

The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS) was signed on August 17, 2015, by the government of President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar, mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with provisions for power-sharing, transitional governance, and security sector reform including demilitarization of Juba. Initial implementation saw Machar's return to Juba as first vice president in April 2016, but mutual distrust, incomplete disarmament of rival forces in the capital, and unresolved command structures undermined progress, setting the stage for renewed violence.

Heavy fighting broke out in Juba on July 7, 2016, between Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) government troops—predominantly Dinka—and SPLA-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO) forces under Machar, lasting until July 11 and resulting in at least 300 confirmed deaths, widespread looting, and the displacement of tens of thousands from the city. Machar fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo and later Sudan, while the government appointed Taban Deng Gai, a Nuer ally, as his replacement in August 2016, fracturing SPLA-IO unity and rendering ARCISS effectively defunct as fighting spread to rural fronts in Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal. This episode exemplified ceasefire failures rooted in non-compliance with security provisions, ethnic command rivalries, and the absence of verifiable monitoring mechanisms, leading to a protracted stalemate of low-intensity attrition warfare without decisive territorial gains for either side.

The post-Juba period saw escalating factionalization, as disillusionment with Kiir-Machar elite pacts drove defections and new armed groups, fragmenting battle lines and complicating mediation efforts. In March 2017, former SPLA Deputy Chief of General Staff Thomas Cirillo Swaka, from the Bari ethnic group in Equatoria, resigned and founded the National Salvation Front/Army (NAS), criticizing Kiir's government for Dinka dominance, corruption, and failure to address non-Nuer/Dinka marginalization, attracting recruits from Equatorian communities weary of the binary ethnic framing of the war. Within government ranks, Dinka infighting surfaced with the May 2017 dismissal of powerful Chief of General Staff Paul Malong Awan, whose subsequent exile fueled rumors of nascent pro-Malong militias in northern Bahr el Ghazal, exposing fissures over resource control and patronage. Nuer defections from SPLA-IO, including mid-level commanders questioning Machar's leadership amid supply shortages, further splintered opposition cohesion, creating parallel fronts that evaded centralized ceasefires.

These dynamics imposed severe costs on the stalemate, with UN estimates indicating over 50,000 direct war deaths by late 2016 and total excess mortality— including indirect famine and disease—approaching 190,000 by mid-2017, driven by disrupted aid access and scorched-earth tactics in contested areas. Multiple 2017 ceasefire declarations, such as those brokered by IGAD and the African Union, collapsed within weeks due to tactical violations for territorial grabs, underscoring how factional proliferation sustained low-level violence and eroded incentives for comprehensive settlement. By late 2017, over 2 million South Sudanese were internally displaced, with the splintered landscape prolonging the conflict by diluting opposition leverage and enabling government divide-and-rule strategies.

2018 Revitalized Agreement and partial de-escalation (2018–2020)

The IGAD-mediated revitalization process, hosted in Khartoum by Sudan, produced the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) on 12 September 2018, signed by President Salva Kiir's government, Riek Machar's Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), and other factions. Building on the 2015 Agreement but addressing its collapse, the R-ARCSS outlined power-sharing in the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), allocating 53% of ministries to the incumbent government, 33% to SPLM/A-IO, 9% to SSOA, 3% to opposition parties, and 2% to former detainees, alongside expanding the Transitional National Legislative Assembly to 550 seats with proportional representation and mandating 35% female participation in executive bodies. It also reinforced a permanent ceasefire from the 27 June 2018 Khartoum Declaration, effective 1 July, requiring disengagement, cantonment of forces within 45 days, and unification into a single army within eight months.

Formation of the RTGoNU, due within eight months of the agreement's effective date, was delayed by disputes over state boundaries (reducing from 32 to 10 or 21), security guarantees for Machar, and insufficient funding for cantonment sites, with IGAD extending the pre-transitional period until February 2020. On 22 February 2020, Kiir was sworn in as president, Machar as first vice president, and four additional vice presidents appointed, followed by a 35-member Council of Ministers by mid-March, marking partial adherence to power-sharing but highlighting elite-level bargaining over substantive reforms.

The agreement temporarily halted major battles between signatory forces, reducing organized offensives and enabling relative stability compared to 2013–2017 levels, as verified by monitoring mechanisms like CTSAMVM. However, compliance lapses permitted ongoing low-level skirmishes, including insurgent activities by non-signatory groups in Equatoria and intercommunal clashes over resources in Bahr el Ghazal, displacing thousands and underscoring the agreement's failure to curb subnational violence tied to ethnic militias.

Early red flags emerged in security implementation under Chapter II, where cantonment screened only partial forces (e.g., fewer than 50,000 of targeted 83,000 SPLM/A-IO troops by late 2019) and unification stalled due to command rivalries, leaving parallel armies intact. Constitutional processes under Chapter VI faced similar delays, with legislation for the National Constitutional Review Commission not enacted within six months and public consultations postponed, reflecting insufficient political commitment to institutionalize power-sharing beyond elite pacts. These gaps perpetuated underlying fractures, as the agreement prioritized cessation of hostilities over verifiable disarmament or inclusive governance, allowing localized escalations to erode gains.

Renewed tensions, splinter violence, and fragile stasis (2021–2025)

In early 2025, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) escalated its disengagement from the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) unity mechanisms, citing persistent distrust and unilateral decisions by President Salva Kiir's administration, including the dismissal of SPLM-IO-aligned officials like Defence Minister Angelina Teny in 2023. This culminated in SPLM-IO's formal withdrawal from state organizations in March 2025 and a September declaration that the transitional government had collapsed following the suspension and arrest of opposition leader Riek Machar, rendering the administration illegitimate in their view. Violence in Nasir, Upper Nile State, in March 2025, linked to these tensions, prompted Machar's detention and further fractured power-sharing structures established under the 2018 accord.

President Kiir's visible health decline, amid recurring rumors of serious ailments requiring treatment abroad—such as a July 2025 absence in the UAE for medical tests—intensified elite jockeying for succession within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and broader regime circles. These uncertainties, compounded by reduced oil revenues from Sudan's war disrupting exports, prompted Kiir to consolidate power through arrests of rivals and upending R-ARCSS provisions, exacerbating fears of renewed elite fragmentation without a clear post-Kiir transition plan.

Splinter groups and holdouts, including the National Salvation Front (NAS) in Greater Equatoria, sustained low-level violence in Jonglei and Upper Nile states, where intercommunal clashes intertwined with political insurgencies displaced communities and hindered stabilization. Escalations in these regions, including government offensives retaking NAS-linked areas like Nasir in April 2025, followed patterns of defection and militia activity, with reports of aerial bombardments and retaliatory fighting. Broader intercommunal violence in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile—often fueled by resource competition—resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths annually, as documented in UN and local reports.

Cattle raiding emerged as a persistent driver of this fragile stasis, with armed herders conducting large-scale thefts that killed dozens per incident and cumulatively hundreds yearly, blocking agricultural normalization and exacerbating ethnic frictions. Notable events included a January 2025 raid in Magwi County, Eastern Equatoria, killing dozens and displacing 18,000; an August raid in Central Equatoria claiming 10 lives; and over 112 deaths linked to thefts in Lakes State alone by mid-2025. These raids, often involving heavy weaponry, underscored the interplay of economic desperation, youth unemployment, and weak state control in perpetuating cycles of revenge violence.

The cumulative impact manifested in massive displacements, with UN data recording approximately 300,000 people fleeing South Sudan due to conflict in 2025 alone, including nearly 150,000 crossing into Sudan amid clashes. This outflow, driven by the above dynamics, reflected a low-intensity persistence of hostilities—sporadic but lethal—rather than outright relapse to 2013-scale war, yet sufficient to strain humanitarian resources and entrench stasis without unified security reforms.

Belligerents, Alliances, and Internal Fractures

Government of South Sudan and aligned forces

The primary military force of the Government of South Sudan during the civil war was the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), commanded by President Salva Kiir Mayardit and later redesignated as the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) in 2018. The SPLA maintained an estimated strength of around 190,000 active personnel, including ground forces, by the mid-2010s, though exact figures fluctuated due to desertions and recruitment. Forces under Kiir's control secured Juba, the capital, from the war's outset in December 2013 and retained dominance over key oil-producing regions, such as parts of Unity and Upper Nile states, enabling continued crude oil extraction despite intermittent shutdowns from combat.

Ethnically, the SPLA under Kiir became predominantly Dinka-led following mass defections of Nuer soldiers to the opposition in late 2013 and early 2014, which realigned the army's composition toward Dinka dominance in leadership and ranks. Loyalist elements from other groups, including defecting Nuer units from splintered opposition factions, bolstered government ranks over time, with over 200 SPLA-IO fighters integrating into the SSPDF by March 2025 alone. The force incorporated allied militias from non-Dinka communities, though core command structures reflected Dinka preponderance, with the ethnic group comprising approximately 35-36% of South Sudan's population.

Government strategies emphasized resource control and urban strongholds, initially augmented by Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) deployment starting December 2013, which assisted SPLA advances to reclaim territory like Bentiu until the UPDF's phased withdrawal aligned with the August 2015 peace accord, completed by early 2017. To preserve cohesion amid factional risks and defections, Kiir's administration implemented internal security measures, including officer reassignments and loyalty vetting, while allegations of graft within the SPLA persisted, tied to oil revenue mismanagement.

Major opposition factions and their evolutions

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), led by Riek Machar, emerged as the primary opposition faction following his dismissal as vice president on July 23, 2013, and the subsequent violence in Juba on December 15, 2013. Predominantly drawing support from the Nuer ethnic group, SPLM-IO initially positioned itself as a reformist movement within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) framework, advocating for greater internal democracy and federalism to address centralized power imbalances. Under Machar's leadership, the group controlled significant territories in Upper Nile, Jonglei, and parts of Unity states during the early war phases, leveraging Nuer militias including the White Army for mobilization. Efforts to broaden beyond its Nuer core included recruiting non-Nuer commanders, though ethnic loyalties remained central to its cohesion.

Smaller opposition entities, such as those in Equatoria region, operated with distinct regional grievances against perceived Dinka dominance in Juba's government, emphasizing demands for federalism, resource decentralization, and protection from northern ethnic incursions. The National Salvation Front (NAS), led by Thomas Cirillo, exemplifies these groups, controlling pockets in Central and Eastern Equatoria through guerrilla tactics focused on self-determination and anti-corruption platforms rather than nationwide rebellion. Similarly, factions like the South Sudan United Front (SSUF) articulated Equatorian-specific complaints over land rights and marginalization, maintaining limited territorial holds in remote areas while rejecting full integration into larger alliances. These entities prioritized local autonomy over ideological alignment with SPLM-IO, reflecting grievances rooted in wartime displacement and atrocities by government forces.

Post-2018 Revitalized Agreement, SPLM-IO experienced substantial territorial contraction, with government-orchestrated defections—particularly in Unity State—eroding its military capacity and fragmenting command structures. By 2023, SPLM-IO was described as politically and militarily weakened, retaining influence mainly through holdout forces rather than consolidated zones. Smaller factions followed suit, with many leaders pursuing pragmatic side arrangements for political positions, diluting original ideological commitments to federalism in favor of survival amid resource scarcity. This shift marked a broader evolution from a nominally unified anti-Kiir front to decentralized warlord dynamics, exacerbated by external patronage that incentivized localized power grabs over coordinated resistance.

Patterns of defection, infighting, and militia proliferation

Taban Deng Gai, the military chief of staff for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) led by Riek Machar, defected to the government of President Salva Kiir in July 2016 amid escalating clashes in Juba. This high-profile switch, facilitated by Gai's appointment as First Vice President replacing Machar, fractured the opposition along patronage lines, with Gai securing control over key resources and positions previously held by Machar loyalists. Such defections, often motivated by rivalries over spoils and access to power rather than ideological differences, weakened unified opposition fronts and prolonged the conflict by enabling government co-optation of rebel elements.

Infighting extended to intra-ethnic fractures, where personal ambitions exacerbated sub-clan rivalries and created localized "mini-wars" detached from broader war objectives. Among the Nuer, clashes erupted between Machar-aligned forces and those loyal to Gai's splinter faction, including inter-Nuer militia engagements in Unity State that diverted resources from frontline fighting against government troops. Similarly, within the Dinka, tensions between sub-clans—such as those from Warrap (Kiir's base) and Aweil (associated with former army chief Paul Malong Awan)—led to armed skirmishes over influence and cattle raiding corridors, undermining cohesion in government-aligned forces. These patterns reflected a shift from ethnic bloc warfare to clan-based competitions, where leaders prioritized sub-group dominance over collective strategic aims.

The resultant militia proliferation compounded fragmentation, with new groups emerging from defections and infighting to pursue autonomous agendas like resource control and revenge cycles. By 2017, over 40 additional armed groups had formed, primarily through splits in Equatoria and northern regions, complicating ceasefire enforcement as these entities operated independently of major factions. This splintering, documented in field assessments, eroded command structures on all sides, as militias evaded accountability and sustained low-level violence that sabotaged peace initiatives like the 2015 and 2018 agreements.

International Actors and Interventions

Regional influences and cross-border support

Uganda intervened militarily in South Sudan in December 2013, deploying elements of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) to support President Salva Kiir's government forces against rebels aligned with former Vice President Riek Machar. Ugandan troops participated in key operations, including the recapture of Bor, the capital of Jonglei State, from opposition forces in late December 2013 and early January 2014. This deployment, numbering several thousand soldiers, was justified by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni as necessary to prevent the conflict's spillover into Uganda and to protect Ugandan nationals and investments in South Sudan, reflecting longstanding personal and strategic ties between Museveni and Kiir dating back to the Sudanese civil wars. The intervention drew criticism for prolonging the conflict by tipping the balance in favor of Kiir, with Ugandan forces operating under South Sudanese command and utilizing air support against rebel positions. Ugandan troops began withdrawing in 2015 following international pressure and the signing of a transitional peace agreement, though sporadic UPDF presence persisted amid accusations of continued covert support.

Sudan provided indirect support to Machar's Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) through porous border areas, facilitating arms and logistical flows to opposition factions as leverage in disputes over oil transit fees and pipeline security. South Sudan's oil exports, which constitute over 90% of its revenue, rely on pipelines traversing Sudanese territory to Port Sudan, creating incentives for Khartoum to back anti-Kiir elements to pressure Juba on fee payments and border demarcations unresolved since independence in 2011. Sudanese authorities have hosted SPLM-IO training camps and allowed cross-border movements, though official denials persist; these actions align with Sudan's strategic interest in weakening Kiir's government, perceived as aligned with Uganda, rather than fostering regional peace. Evidence of small arms and ammunition re-transfers from Sudanese stockpiles, originally sourced internationally, has been documented entering South Sudan via these routes, sustaining rebel capabilities amid government embargoes.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), comprising Ethiopia, Kenya, and other East African states, led mediation efforts including the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, but faced persistent accusations of bias stemming from members' national agendas. Ethiopia, under Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, initially hosted talks but was criticized for favoring Kiir due to historical SPLM ties and border security concerns, while Kenya's role drew ire from Sudan for perceived pro-South Sudanese leanings amid oil rivalries. Sudan's exclusion from key IGAD decisions exacerbated distrust, as Khartoum viewed the body as partial to Kiir's allies like Uganda, undermining mediation neutrality and contributing to repeated ceasefire failures. IGAD's efforts prioritized elite power-sharing over grassroots reconciliation, reflecting members' self-interested pursuit of economic corridors and refugee management rather than impartial conflict resolution.

Cross-border refugee flows have intensified regional strains, with Uganda hosting over 1 million South Sudanese refugees as of September 2025, representing more than half of its total refugee population and overburdening settlements in northern districts. These inflows, peaking during escalations like the 2016 Juba clashes, have sparked local resource competitions over land, water, and jobs, prompting Ugandan authorities to impose stricter registration and aid restrictions amid domestic political pressures. Similar spillovers into Ethiopia and Kenya have fueled militia cross-border raids and arms smuggling, perpetuating cycles of proxy involvement driven by host states' internal stability concerns rather than altruistic humanitarianism. Neighboring governments' tolerance of refugee hosting often serves as leverage in bilateral negotiations with Juba, underscoring the conflict's entanglement with regional realpolitik.

UNMISS and Western diplomatic efforts: Outcomes and limitations

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1996 on 8 July 2011, shortly after South Sudan's independence, with an initial mandate to protect civilians, support the peace process, and monitor human rights. The mission's authorized troop strength reached a ceiling of 17,000 military personnel and 2,101 police by subsequent resolutions, though actual deployments hovered around 13,000-14,000 troops in the mid-2010s amid the civil war's escalation.

UNMISS achieved partial successes in civilian protection through Protection of Civilians (POC) sites established on its bases, which by March 2017 sheltered approximately 214,000 displaced persons across six locations, including Juba and Bentiu, providing temporary refuge from ethnic targeting and combat. By June 2020, these sites still hosted over 180,000 individuals, demonstrating the mission's role in mitigating immediate threats in urban hotspots. However, these efforts were constrained by the sites' basic conditions and inability to address broader displacement, as the vast majority of South Sudan's internally displaced persons remained outside UNMISS perimeters.

Despite its mandate and resources, UNMISS faced significant limitations in preventing violence, exemplified by operational failures during key atrocities. In July 2016, intense fighting in Juba between government and opposition forces led to civilian massacres near UNMISS compounds, where an internal UN investigation found peacekeepers committed major errors, including inadequate response and positioning, exacerbating the death toll estimated at hundreds. Similarly, in early 2013, attacks on a POC site in Bor resulted in dozens of civilian deaths due to insufficient perimeter security and delayed reinforcements, highlighting recurring accountability gaps in threat assessment. Broader critiques pointed to a risk-averse culture within UNMISS, marked by chaotic leadership and hesitancy to engage combatants proactively, which allowed hundreds of civilians to face rape and killing without effective intervention in 2016.

Western diplomatic efforts, led by the United States and European Union, supplemented UNMISS through targeted sanctions regimes initiated in 2015 to deter atrocities by key leaders. The US imposed asset freezes and travel bans on figures including President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar for undermining peace and enabling abuses, while the EU aligned with UN measures under Resolution 2206, expanding to additional commanders by 2018. These sanctions aimed to pressure compliance with ceasefires, yet enforcement faced mixed results, with evasion via proxy arms flows and limited asset seizures due to opaque financial networks.

International aid channeled through Western donors totaled billions of dollars by 2020, funding humanitarian relief and state-building, but outcomes were undermined by elite capture and corruption, diverting resources from intended civilian protections. UN investigations revealed systemic siphoning, such as off-budget schemes estimated at over $2 billion, which fueled patronage rather than security reforms, rendering diplomatic leverage ineffective against entrenched incentives for conflict. Overall, while UNMISS and Western initiatives provided localized safeguards, their passivity and inability to alter elite behaviors contributed to prolonged instability, as violence persisted despite over a decade of engagement.

Critiques of foreign aid dependency and peacekeeping ineffectiveness

Critics of foreign aid in South Sudan argue that it has created a profound dependency trap, shielding political elites from the imperatives of state-building and reform by substituting for absent governance in essential services. Humanitarian assistance, which accounts for approximately 25% of the country's gross national income, has effectively functioned as a parallel authority, allowing leaders to divert domestic revenues—primarily oil, comprising 98% of the budget—toward patronage networks and parallel military forces rather than investing in sustainable institutions. This dynamic prolongs conflict intransigence, as aid inflows reduce the political costs of failed ceasefires and factional violence, enabling elites to sustain power grabs without accountability for economic diversification or fiscal responsibility.

Empirical assessments highlight elite capture as a core mechanism, with aid resources frequently appropriated through networks linked to high-level officials, fostering corruption and militia proliferation instead of national cohesion. In instances of aid windfalls, such as community-targeted distributions, extensive diversion by local elites has not only entrenched inequalities but also incited communal clashes over resources, perpetuating cycles of violence. Ninety percent of surveyed public health experts attribute this dependency to insufficient political commitment rather than inherent incapacity, underscoring how external support disincentivizes the internal reforms needed to break the cycle.

United Nations peacekeeping efforts via UNMISS have similarly faced scrutiny for ineffectiveness, particularly in failing to deter widespread atrocities despite a mandate prioritizing civilian protection under Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norms. High-profile lapses, including the inability to prevent attacks on civilians and aid workers in 2016 Juba clashes, exposed limitations in rules of engagement and troop readiness, resulting in reactive containment rather than proactive conflict resolution. Doctrinal emphases on universal protection principles have been critiqued for disregarding South Sudan's entrenched power realities—such as elite-driven resource predation and ethnic patronage—allowing missions to prioritize short-term stabilization over confronting causal incentives for warlordism.

Alternative views posit that aid has forestalled absolute state collapse amid ongoing hostilities, channeling resources through international NGOs to reach vulnerable populations despite elite barriers. However, quantitative evidence of appropriation and qualitative analyses of political economy reveal that such interventions often reinforce elite leverage, with humanitarian permanence entrenching a system where external support subsidizes internal dysfunction rather than catalyzing genuine de-escalation.

Humanitarian and Societal Impacts

Combatant and civilian casualties

A comprehensive study by researchers from the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine estimated that South Sudan's civil war resulted in approximately 383,000 excess deaths from December 2013 to April 2018, encompassing both direct violent causes and indirect effects such as disease outbreaks and food insecurity. Of this total, roughly 190,000 deaths were directly attributable to violence, highlighting the conflict's dual impact of combat and non-combat mortality. These figures derive from statistical modeling of survey data, household mortality rates, and population estimates, accounting for displacement and underreporting in remote areas.

Battle-related deaths, as tracked by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), represent a narrower subset focused on fatalities occurring during direct confrontations between organized armed actors, including incidental civilian losses in crossfire. UCDP data indicate annual battle-related deaths peaked in the thousands during the war's initial phases (2013–2016) but declined sharply post-2018 ceasefire, with only 188 recorded in 2021 and similarly low figures through 2023. These primarily involve combatants, with losses distributed relatively evenly between government-aligned forces and opposition groups due to symmetric guerrilla tactics and militia engagements, though precise combatant breakdowns remain limited by incomplete field reporting.

Civilian casualties constitute the majority of violent deaths, often exceeding 80% in estimates that incorporate one-sided attacks and targeted killings beyond formal battle contexts. UCDP and associated datasets distinguish these from battle deaths, noting that ethnic militias and splinter factions frequently conducted deliberate assaults on non-combatants, amplifying the civilian toll independent of frontline clashes. Post-2018, low-intensity skirmishes and intercommunal violence have added thousands more deaths; for instance, UNMISS documented 739 civilian fatalities from violence between January and March 2025 alone, underscoring persistent risks despite reduced large-scale operations.

Empirical challenges persist in casualty verification, with underreporting exacerbated by humanitarian access denials, vast ungoverned territories, and the absence of centralized vital registration systems. Sources like UCDP rely on media aggregation, NGO reports, and official claims, which may underestimate totals by 20–50% in conflict zones due to unverified incidents and incentives for parties to obscure losses. Multiple corroborating studies emphasize this gap, advocating for integrated one-sided violence data to capture the full spectrum of direct fatalities.

Mass displacement, famine, and infrastructure devastation

The South Sudanese Civil War has triggered waves of mass displacement, with over 1.9 million people internally displaced (IDPs) and approximately 2.4 million refugees hosted in neighboring countries as of mid-2025, totaling more than 4.3 million forcibly displaced individuals. These figures stem directly from recurrent fighting, which disrupts settlements in conflict hotspots like Unity and Jonglei states, forcing populations into makeshift camps and urban peripheries where access to services is limited. In 2025 alone, conflict-driven outflows added around 300,000 new displacements, exacerbating overcrowding and straining host communities amid ongoing escalations.

Famine conditions, first formally declared by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) on February 20, 2017, in parts of Unity State, affected nearly 100,000 people facing starvation due to war-induced blockades that halted food and aid convoys. Recurrent IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) classifications have followed, with military obstructions and agricultural disruptions—such as flooded fields from unmaintained dams and abandoned farming during offensives—preventing harvests and inflating food prices. While precise starvation death tolls are elusive, war-related food insecurity has contributed to excess mortality, with blockades explicitly cited by UN agencies as causal factors in preventing humanitarian access and sustaining acute malnutrition cycles.

Infrastructure devastation, particularly in the oil sector that accounts for over 90% of government revenue, has halved effective GDP contributions through sabotage and neglect during battles over fields in Upper Nile and Unity states. Oil production plummeted from pre-war peaks of around 350,000 barrels per day to roughly 150,000 by 2024, as pipelines ruptured from lack of maintenance and direct combat damage, triggering a 24.5% economic contraction in the prior year. This collapse fueled hyperinflation exceeding 100% annually by late 2024, with consumer prices surging 112.6% year-over-year in October, as currency devaluation and import dependencies amplified war-sparked shortages of fuel, roads, and power grids. Rural roads and bridges, vital for market access, remain cratered from artillery and militia movements, perpetuating isolation and economic stagnation.

Atrocities, including ethnic targeting and sexual violence by multiple parties

Government forces under President Salva Kiir, predominantly Dinka, initiated ethnic targeting in Juba on December 15-19, 2013, with soldiers conducting house-to-house searches and killing hundreds of Nuer civilians, including women and children, often based on ethnic identity. Opposition forces loyal to Riek Machar, largely Nuer, retaliated in Bentiu in April 2014, where SPLA-IO fighters massacred Dinka and other non-Nuer civilians in mosques, hospitals, and markets, with estimates of 200 to 400 deaths in targeted killings. The African Union Commission of Inquiry documented similar patterns of ethnic cleansing attempts in Unity State, including mass killings and forced displacement by both government and opposition elements to alter demographic balances.

In Malakal, ethnic reprisals escalated; government-aligned forces, including Dinka militias, attacked a UN protection of civilians site on February 17-18, 2016, killing at least 18 and targeting Shilluk and Nuer residents amid Dinka-Shilluk tensions, with attackers in military uniforms breaching the perimeter and setting fires that destroyed 35% of shelters. Rebel forces had previously targeted Dinka in the area during 2013-2014 offensives, contributing to cycles of vengeance. These acts, including deliberate civilian targeting and destruction of property, met criteria for war crimes as outlined in reports from Human Rights Watch and the AU Commission.

Sexual violence was systematically employed as a weapon by forces on all sides, with Human Rights Watch documenting rape, gang rape, and sexual slavery in Unity State from 2014 onward, perpetrated by government troops, opposition fighters, and affiliated militias against women and girls across ethnic lines to terrorize communities. The AU Commission reported over 1,000 verified cases of rape and other sexual abuses between 2013 and 2015, often involving extreme brutality such as mutilation, with low accountability as perpetrators faced minimal prosecution. A 2022 UN Human Rights Commission report highlighted ongoing patterns, noting forced pregnancies from rapes and the role of sexual violence in sustaining ethnic animosities, committed by SPLA, SPLA-IO, and splinter groups alike.

Child recruitment proliferated across factions, with the United Nations verifying over 19,000 children recruited or used in hostilities since December 2013, including by government forces, SPLA-IO, and local militias like the Nuer White Army, often through coercion or abduction as young as age 10. Demobilization efforts released thousands, but re-recruitment persisted due to weak command structures and incentives for commanders to bolster numbers without repercussions, as evidenced by UN monitoring from 2015-2018. Prosecution rates remained negligible, enabling impunity that perpetuated the practice among multiple parties.

Peace Negotiations and Persistent Obstacles

Evolution of agreements from 2015 onward

The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), signed on August 17, 2015, established a power-sharing formula allocating 53 percent of executive positions to President Salva Kiir's Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), 33 percent to Riek Machar's Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), 7 percent to other registered political parties, and 7 percent to former detainees and other stakeholders. It mandated the demilitarization of the capital Juba, creation of demilitarized zones along internal borders, and a permanent ceasefire with unification of forces under a single command. These provisions aimed to facilitate a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), but implementation faltered amid mutual accusations of violations.

Tensions escalated into open fighting in Juba on July 7, 2016, when SPLA forces loyal to Kiir clashed with SPLM-IO troops under Machar, resulting in over 300 deaths, widespread looting, and sexual violence against civilians, directly breaching the ceasefire and demilitarization terms. The offensive displaced Machar's forces northward and prompted his flight to Sudan, collapsing the fragile TGoNU formed in April 2016 and necessitating IGAD-mediated revitalization talks.

The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), signed on September 12, 2018, reaffirmed the 53-33-7-7 power-sharing ratio while granting the SPLM-IO the First Vice Presidency and proportional cabinet allocations, including approximately one-third of ministerial posts to opposition groups. Chapter II outlined security reforms, including a permanent ceasefire, strategic disarmament, and cantonment of approximately 83,000 SPLM-IO and 120,000 SPLM forces for gradual integration into a unified army of 60,000 troops, with unification targeted within 180 days of TGoNU formation. The agreement extended the transitional period to December 2021, prioritizing elite bargains over broader reforms.

Implementation of R-ARCSS lagged, particularly Chapter II, with cantonment sites established but only partial force assembly by 2020 due to disputes over command structures, funding shortfalls, and non-compliance by both parties in verifying troop numbers. Sporadic clashes persisted, undermining the security merger. Post-2020, parties adopted a Roadmap Agreement on August 4, 2022, extending the transition by 24 months to February 2025 amid incomplete unification and electoral delays, though cantonment remained stalled with fewer than 50 percent of forces reportedly assembled. Further extensions were discussed in 2024, reflecting ongoing breaches tied to resource allocation and command rivalries.

Failures due to elite incentives, accountability gaps, and implementation lapses

South Sudanese elites have prioritized personal power retention over national unification, maintaining parallel command structures and private militias that undermine the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Leaders such as President Salva Kiir and opposition figure Riek Machar have sustained loyalty through patronage, diverting oil revenues—South Sudan's dominant income source, accounting for over 90% of exports—to fund these forces rather than integrating them into a single national army. Independent investigations reveal systematic looting of oil funds, with billions unaccounted for between 2021 and 2024, enabling bribes to commanders and perpetuating conflict incentives over disarmament.

Accountability for atrocities has been systematically evaded, with no prosecutions of senior figures despite extensive evidence of war crimes, including ethnic massacres and rape campaigns by forces on all sides. The R-ARCSS-mandated Hybrid Court for South Sudan, intended to address crimes since December 2013, remains unestablished due to elite resistance, fostering impunity that shields perpetrators within ruling coalitions. International Criminal Court (ICC) involvement has been stymied by South Sudan's non-ratification of the Rome Statute and absence of Security Council referral, leaving documented referrals from UN commissions unenforced.

Implementation of core R-ARCSS provisions, particularly security sector reform, has faltered due to verifiable non-compliance, as tracked by the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC). Cantonment and unification of opposing forces lagged critically, with no agreement on command structures or ratios by September 2021, and only partial progress in screening by 2023 amid ongoing holdouts by factional leaders. RJMEC assessments through 2025 highlight persistent delays in these steps, directly attributable to elites' retention of armed leverage for bargaining power, contributing to recurrent ceasefire breaches.

Current status, succession risks, and 2025 escalations

The unity government formed under the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan remains fragile, characterized by the absence of First Vice President Riek Machar, who has been in exile since 2019, and ongoing political deadlock that has undermined power-sharing mechanisms. Escalating inter-communal and factional violence in 2025, particularly in Jonglei and Upper Nile states, has displaced over 300,000 people from the country amid clashes between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) and government-aligned forces, including the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF). These incidents, such as the SSPDF's dislodgement of SPLM/A-IO positions in Jonglei's Diel and Atar in April 2025, reflect not genuine peace but an elite stasis where rival leaders prioritize control over reconciliation, fostering impunity through corruption and resource mismanagement.

President Salva Kiir's recent actions, including the dismissal and reinstatement of military chief Paul Malong Awan in October 2025 after just three months, signal acute fears of a power vacuum as his health visibly declines and succession maneuvering intensifies. Kiir has upended cabinet and security appointments to sideline potential rivals, including figures from the 2018 deal, while exploiting regional instability to position loyalists, thereby eroding the agreement's framework and heightening risks of factional fragmentation upon his exit. This consolidation, driven by ethnic patronage networks rather than institutional stability, leaves the state vulnerable to collapse, as evidenced by boosted recruitment by opposition groups like the National Salvation Front.

United Nations officials have repeatedly warned of an imminent relapse into full-scale civil war in 2025, citing over 1,800 conflict-related deaths, widespread sexual violence, and child recruitment from January to September, exacerbated by elite impunity enabled by unaddressed corruption in oil revenues and aid flows. The UN Human Rights Commission described the crisis as stemming from "deliberate choices" by leaders, urging decisive intervention to avert escalation, while Security Council briefings highlighted deteriorating human rights amid stalled elections postponed to 2026. This stasis masks underlying volatility, with 2025's violence spikes—triggered by territorial disputes and spillover from Sudan's war—demonstrating how elite power preservation perpetuates cycles of impunity over accountable governance.

Analytical Perspectives and Debates

Viewpoints on primary drivers: Tribalism versus elite power grabs

One perspective attributes the civil war's persistence to entrenched tribal animosities, particularly between the Dinka and Nuer, South Sudan's largest ethnic groups, with anthropological records documenting recurrent cattle raids and disputes over pastures and water sources dating back centuries. These conflicts, often framed as manifestations of segmentary lineage rivalries, are cited as evidence of an inherent "tribal" predisposition toward violence, exacerbated by colonial-era stereotypes portraying groups like the Nuer as inherently aggressive warriors. However, archival and ethnographic analyses reveal that Dinka-Nuer interactions along border regions like the Sobat and Zaraf valleys involved periods of alliance, trade, and intermarriage alongside hostilities, suggesting enmity was situational rather than primordial.

A countervailing analysis, supported by policy reports and conflict studies, emphasizes elite power grabs as the causal core, with leaders such as President Salva Kiir (Dinka) and opposition figure Riek Machar (Nuer) exploiting ethnic networks for personal patronage and control over oil revenues rather than organic tribal inevitability driving the strife. This view posits that the 2013 outbreak stemmed from an intra-elite bargain's collapse within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, where victors of the independence struggle repurposed revolutionary coalitions into ethnic clienteles to monopolize state resources amid weak institutions. Empirical data from post-independence resource allocation patterns indicate that elite competition over zero-sum fiscal spoils, including oil fields producing over 150,000 barrels daily in 2011-2012, precipitated mobilization along kin lines, with leaders arming co-ethnics to secure loyalty rather than ethnic hatreds spontaneously erupting.

Integrating these, econometric assessments highlight how resource scarcity—such as arid pastoral zones strained by population pressures and variable rainfall—interacts with elite incentives, amplifying factional violence where leaders leverage scarcity narratives to consolidate support. Models correlating local climatic stressors with conflict incidence in Sudan-South Sudan borderlands show a 10-20% uptick in violent events during drought episodes, but attribute escalation to governance failures enabling elite capture of aid and rents, rather than autonomous tribal dynamics. This causal realism underscores that while historical frictions provide exploitable fissures, verifiable power asymmetries and rent-seeking behaviors among a narrow cadre of Juba-based actors remain the proximate drivers, as evidenced by repeated elite pacts prioritizing personal security over inclusive governance.

Evaluations of state-building failures in Africa's newest nation

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), upon assuming governance after South Sudan's independence on July 9, 2011, inherited a legacy of militarized command structures from its decades-long bush war against Khartoum, which precluded the establishment of civilian-led institutions essential for stable state-building. This guerrilla ethos prioritized hierarchical loyalty and armed control over bureaucratic professionalism, resulting in the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) seamlessly becoming the national military without meaningful demobilization or separation of powers, thereby entrenching elite military dominance and sidelining non-combatant civil society inputs.

A core governance void emerged from the failure to implement effective federalism or a functional taxation system, exacerbating center-periphery revolts by denying peripheral regions autonomy and revenue-sharing mechanisms. Although the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and post-independence transitional constitution outlined decentralization, the SPLM-led government resisted devolving substantive fiscal or administrative powers to states, maintaining Juba's monopoly on resource allocation and perpetuating grievances among ethnic groups outside Dinka core areas. Concurrently, taxation efforts faltered due to over-reliance on oil rents—constituting over 90% of government revenue—without cultivating a broad-based tax regime that could foster civic accountability or local buy-in, as historic centralization patterns persisted unchecked by legislation.

This institutional neglect culminated in kleptocratic capture of oil wealth, diverging starkly from resource-rich peers like Botswana, where diamond revenues were channeled through accountable institutions yielding sustained growth and stability. In South Sudan, elites systematically diverted funds, including an estimated $2.2 billion from the 2021–2024 Oil for Roads scheme intended for infrastructure, amid broader patterns of patronage that starved public services and fueled conflict cycles. Botswana's contrast underscores how South Sudan's leadership disregarded foundational principles of revenue transparency and anti-corruption safeguards, prioritizing personal enrichment over state capacity-building.

Prospects for stability amid corruption and external meddling

South Sudan's entrenched corruption severely undermines prospects for lasting stability, as evidenced by its ranking as the world's most corrupt nation in the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, scoring just 8 out of 100 according to Transparency International's assessment of public sector graft. This systemic issue, including elite capture of oil revenues and illicit contracts, perpetuates fiscal mismanagement and incentivizes relapse into violence, with a United Nations inquiry in September 2025 documenting how corruption has unleashed a human rights crisis by hollowing out state institutions and fueling elite power grabs over accountability. Without verifiable anti-corruption measures, such as auditing oil streams and canceling corrupt deals as recommended by the UN, the risk of renewed civil war remains high, particularly amid elite recycling in politics that prioritizes personal enrichment over governance reforms.

Countering this pessimism, grassroots peace initiatives in counties like Gogrial and Yei River demonstrate bottom-up resilience, where local agreements foster dialogue and reduce inter-communal violence independent of national elite pacts. Recent efforts, including UN-supported peace hubs handed over to traditional authorities in October 2025 and women's-led political engagement programs launched in 2023, highlight potential for community-driven stability by addressing local grievances over tribalism and resource disputes, though scalability depends on shielding these from national corruption.

External meddling exacerbates dysfunction, with Sudan's ongoing civil war disrupting South Sudan's oil exports via shared pipelines since 2024, compounding economic collapse and enabling factional opportunism, while historical interventions by neighbors like Uganda and Sudan have prolonged elite incentives for conflict. However, deepening aid cuts—such as U.S. reductions in 2025 amid donor fatigue—could compel economic realism by curtailing dependency on foreign assistance that sustains corruption, potentially forcing fiscal reforms and local resource mobilization if violence does not preempt them, as aid has historically substituted for state-building rather than incentivizing it. Overall, stability hinges on internal accountability overriding external enablers, with grassroots momentum offering a contrarian path amid pervasive graft.